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Abstract—Battery participants in performance-based fre-
quency regulation markets must consider the cost of battery
aging in their operating strategies to maximize market profits.
In this paper we solve this problem by proposing an optimal
control policy and an optimal bidding policy based on realistic
market settings and an accurate battery aging model. The
proposed control policy has a threshold structure and achieves
near-optimal performance with respect to an offline controller
that has complete future information. The proposed bidding
policy considers the optimal control policy to maximize market
profits while satisfying the market performance requirement
through a chance-constraint. It factors the value of performance
and supports a trade-off between higher profits and a lower
risk of violating performance requirements. We demonstrate
the optimality of both policies using simulations. A case study
based on the PJM regulation market shows that our approach
is effective at maximizing operating profits.
Index Terms—Battery energy storage, degradation, frequency
regulation, power system economics
NOMENCLATURE
A. Parameters and Variables
B Battery energy storage power rating in MW
bt Battery dispatch power during t in MW
b The set of all battery dispatch power b = {bt}
C Regulation capacity in MW
C Maximum regulation capacity
E Battery energy storage capacity in MWh
E,E Upper and lower energy limit for the battery
energy storage in MWh
E
g
t , E
g
t Upper and lower energy limit enforced by the
control policy g during interval t in MWh
et Battery energy level during t in MWh
e The set of all battery energy levels e = {et}
emaxt , e
min
t Maximum and minimum energy level up to
interval t in MWh
g Control policy for the battery energy storage
i Index of identified cycles
j Index of regulation capacity bid segments
J Number of total bid segments
M Duration of one dispatch interval in hours
R Battery cell replacement price in $/MWh
rt Normalized regulation instruction during t
r The set of all normalized regulation instruc-
tions r = {rt}
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t Dispatch time interval index
T Number of intervals during a market period
ui The depth of cycle i
u Set of all cycle depths
γ Relative regulation capacity in hours
δ Coefficient in the performance index model
λ Regulation market clearing price in $/MW
η Battery charge and discharge efficiency
π Performance penalty price in $/MWh
µλ Expected market clearing price in $/MW
µr Expected total regulation instruction
ρmin Minimum performance index requirement
ξ Performance chance constraint confidence level
B. Functions
A(·) Cycle aging cost function
J(·) Regulation market profit expectation
P (·) Performance index calculation function
Π(·) Regulation market profit
Φ(·) Cycle depth aging stress function
ϕ(·) Derivative of Φ(·)
I. INTRODUCTION
The share of battery energy storage (BES) in the frequency
regulation markets is increasing rapidly [1]. In the PJM
market, the BES capacity has increased from zero in 2005
to over 280 MW in 2017, making up 41% of its regulation
procurement capacity [2]. This growth rate was made possible
by the rapid decrease in battery cell manufacturing cost [3],
the increase in renewable penetration [4], as well as changes
in market rules that have lowered the barrier for batteries to
provide frequency regulation. Following the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) Orders 755 [5] and 784 [6],
all Independent System Operators (ISO) and Regional Trans-
mission Organizations (RTO) in the U.S. have implemented
pay-for-performance regulation markets, and improved the
automatic generation control (AGC) framework to account
for the state of charge (SoC) constraint of energy storage in
their regulation dispatch [7]. In these revised markets, BES
participants are rewarded for their fast and accurate regulation
response. They are also able to offer a very small energy
capacity (15 minutes energy-to-power ratio at minimum) to
provide regulation products specially designed for energy
storage.
2These regulation market reforms have encouraged numerous
BES projects targeted solely at the provision of regulation.
These BES units often behave as price-takers by submitting
offers at zero price into the market and accepting any clearing
prices. If the market prices for regulation are high, these
participants can earn considerable profits with naive control
strategies. However, since the amount of regulation capacity
needed is limited, a market can easily become saturated by too
many price-taking participants. Operational evidence shows
that the PJM RegD market became saturated in 2016 and
its market clearing prices have dropped by two-thirds since
2014 [2], [8], making BES operation hardly profitable with
naive bidding and operating strategies.
BES participants must employ more advanced operating
and bidding strategies to secure operational profits against
dropping market prices and the cost of battery degradation.
Previous studies have assessed how providing regulation with
batteries affects their aging characteristic under simple SoC
control strategies [8]–[19]. However, few studies have actively
incorporated battery aging as part of regulation operation or
bidding optimization objectives. References [20], [21] take
into account the battery lifespan in regulation control opti-
mization, using an aging model that is too simple to reflect
properly the complex battery cycle aging mechanisms. The
results in [22] incorporate the battery aging cost into regulation
bidding strategies, but the proposed method does not optimize
real-time operations.
Since regulation instructions are highly stochastic and occur
at a very high time resolution, accounting for them explicitly
in an optimization problem is computationally challenging. It
is thus crucial to reduce the formulation complexity using
statistical and analytical derivations, and to jointly optimize
the bidding and real-time control strategies. In this work,
we incorporate battery cycle aging into a real-time control
policy that ensures profitability under any market clearing
result. In addition, we introduce a bidding policy based on the
proposed control policy that maximizes profits while satisfying
the market performance requirement. The main contributions
of this paper are as follows:
• We formulate battery bidding and operation in a pay-for-
performance frequency regulation market as a chance-
constrained profit maximization problem that includes an
accurate battery cycle aging model.
• We apply a real-time control policy to optimize the
battery regulation response by balancing the battery cycle
aging cost and the regulation mismatch penalty. This
policy achieves near-optimal control results and applies
to any regulation market designs.
• We prove that under the proposed control policy, the
optimal battery regulation problem is reduced to finding
the highest capacity possible while ensuring the required
regulation performance. We therefore propose a bidding
policy that ensures regulation performance while maxi-
mizing the operational profit by factoring the value of
performance in the frequency regulation market.
• Numerical examples and case studies using real market
data are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed policies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the formulation of the optimization problem. Sec-
tion III introduces the proposed control and bidding policies.
Section IV describes and discusses the simulation results.
Section V concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Frequency Regulation Market Model
We consider a pay-for-performance regulation market in
which a participant is rewarded based on the regulation ca-
pacity it provides, as well as on how much it is instructed
to alter dispatch set-points by the system operator, and how
accurately it follows the regulation instructions. Most system
operators calculate a performance index as the relative error
between a participant’s regulation response and the regulation
instructions [7]. PJM uses a more complicate calculation
method [23].
Pay-for-performance regulation markets have two-part offer
and payment designs. A participant submits a regulation capac-
ity offer and a regulation mileage offer, and then the system
operator unifies the two offer prices into a single modified
offer based on the participant’s historical performance index
and the expected dispatch regulation mileage. In the ex-post
market settlement, the capacity payment is calculated using the
capacity clearing price and the assigned regulation capacity.
The mileage payment is calculated using the mileage clearing
price and the instructed mileage. Depending on the market
design, the performance index is used to penalize the entire
regulation payment, or only the mileage payment. All pay-for-
performance regulation markets also have a minimum perfor-
mance requirement, in which a participant must reach a certain
performance index to be eligible for receiving regulation
payment, and must maintain a satisfactory performance history
to be qualified to participate in the regulation market [8].
The objective of a regulation market participant is to
maximize its operational profit, including the expected mar-
ket payment and the battery aging cost. To formulate this
problem, we start by considering a market period with finite
discrete dispatch intervals t ∈ {1, . . . , T } and a single market
clearing price λ which is calculated based on the capacity
clearing price, the mileage clearing prices, and the instructed
mileage [7]. We assume that the participant receives regulation
instructions that are proportionally scaled with respect to its
regulation capacity C based on a set of normalized regulation
signals r = {rt ∈ [−1, 1]}. The participant receives the pay-
ment P (Cr, b)λC from the regulation market, where b = {bt}
is the participant’s response to the regulation instruction, and
P (·) is the performance index calculation function. We define
P (·) as a linear function of the relative response error:
P (Cr, b) = 1−
||Cr − b||1
C||r||1
δ . (1)
where ||Cr−b||1 calculates the absolute error in the response,
and C||r||1 is the total amount of the instructed regulation
signal. δ ∈ [0, 1] is the part of the regulation payment that
is evaluated based on the relative error of the response. This
is a unified performance model that fits all market rules. The
3value of δ is specific to each market and can be found in each
market manual.
B. BES Operation Model
The BES operation has the following constraints
−B ≤ bt ≤ B (2)
E ≤ et ≤ E (3)
et − et−1 = Mη[bt]
+ −M [−bt]
+/η (4)
where bt is the battery dispatch power at time t, B is the BES
power ratings, e = {et} is the battery energy level at step t,
M is the dispatch interval duration, η is the BES single-trip
charge or discharge efficiency, E and E are the BES upper
and lower energy limits in MWh, and [x]+ = max{x, 0}. (2)
models the BES power rating, (3) models the BES storage
limits, and (4) models the evolution of the state of charge.
C. Battery Aging Model
The chemistry of battery aging process is typically modeled
with partial differential equations [24], [25]. These mod-
els have good accuracy, but are highly nonlinear and pose
significant computational challenges for the optimal control
problems [26]. Instead, many studies on grid-scale BES
optimization formulate battery aging as empirical linear or
quadratic functions with respect to control variables including
active power, energy throughput, and SoC [27]–[35]. These
empirical models can be seamlessly incorporated into linear or
quadratic programming problems and solved within tractable
times. In this paper, we explore an alternative battery modeling
approach by incorporating a systematic cycle counting algo-
rithm into optimization. This approach offers an efficient way
of modeling the varying aging effect from cycles of different
depth. Battery operations in frequency regulation mostly con-
sist shallow cycles due to frequent switching between charging
and discharging. These shallow cycles cause much lower aging
damage per MWh of energy throughput because battery cycle
aging is highly nonlinear with respect to the cycle depth. For
example, a Lithium Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide (NMC)
cell can provide ten times more lifetime energy throughput if
cycled at 10% depth (between 55% SoC and 65% SoC) than
if cycled at 100% depth [36]. This nonlinear aging property,
in which a smaller cycle depth results in a higher lifetime
energy throughput, is observed in most static electrochemical
batteries [13], [37]–[39], and it is therefore crucial to use an
accurate cycle aging model for regulation operation.
The cycle aging cost model we adopt in this study relies
on the rainflow method [40] for cycle identification. The
rainflow method decomposes a set of normalized battery SoC
measurements into a combination of independent cycles and
the cycle aging is calculated with respect to each identified
cycle. The rainflow-based aging model therefore offers much
higher accuracy in irregular battery operations, and has been
extensively adopted for battery life assessment and operation
optimization [22], [41], [42]. The rainflow method decomposes
a SoC series into a combination of cycles as:
u = Rainflow(e/E) (5)
where u is the set of all cycle depths. e = {et} is the BES
energy level set, E is the BES rated energy capacity. e/E
is thus the normalized SoC series. After identifying cycles,
a cycle depth stress function Φ(u) calculates the incremental
battery cycle aging caused by a particular cycle of depth u.
The total cycle life loss is calculated by summing the life loss
from all identified cycles from the SoC series. The cycle depth
stress can be obtained from lab test results [43]–[45] which
are described in the manufacturer’s warranty. Since the battery
cycle aging cost prorates the battery cell replacement cost to
the cycle life loss, the the battery aging cost function A(·) is
defined as follows:
A(b) = ER
∑|u|
i=1 Φ(ui) (6)
where |u| is the cardinality of u, R is the battery cell
replacement cost in $/MWh which includes the disposal cost
of old cells and the purchase and installation cost for new cells.
Φ(u) is the cycle depth aging stress function, and a half cycle
causes half the aging stress of a full cycle. The aging cost
function A is written as a function of b because the battery
SoC is a linear combination of the active power. For example,
if the cell replacement cost of a 1 MWh NMC BES is $300k
and this cell operates 100,000 cycles at 10% cycle depth, then
a 10% depth cycle (0.1 MWh energy throughput) costs $3.
This cell operates only 1,000 cycles at 100% cycle depth, then
a 100% depth cycle (1 MWh energy throughput) would cost
$300.
D. Optimization Problem
If the market clearing price λ and the regulation signal
realization r are known, the participant can find the optimal
regulation capacity C and the optimal BES dispatch b by
solving the following optimization problem
max
C,b
Π(C, λ, r, b) := P (Cr, b)λC −A(b) (7a)
s.t. P (Cr, b) ≥ ρmin (7b)
C ∈ [0, B], constraints (2)–(4) (7c)
where the objective function (7a) maximizes the operating
profit calculated as the market revenue minus the aging cost,
(7b) enforces a minimum performance index ρmin to the
regulation response, (7c) limits the regulation capacity C to be
within the battery power capacity B, and the battery operation
must satisfy the operation constraints (2)–(4).
However, this problem cannot be solved in practice because
the realization of r is not known in advance. The participant
must therefore decide on a policy g that determines bt at time
step t based only on past information. The expected profit J(·)
corresponding to a particular operational policy and regulation
capacity (g, C) is defined as:
J(g, C) = E
[
Π(C, λ, r, bg)
]
= E
[
λC − δλ
||Cr − bg||1
||r||1
−A(bg)
]
, (8)
where the superscript g is included to indicate the dependence
on the control policy g. However, the exact value of λ
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Fig. 1. Flow chart of the regulation market and control processes. The control
policy inputs the clearing prices for determining the optimal response, while
the bidding policy submits offers to the market while considering the control
policy.
and ||r||1 can only be known after the regulation provision,
hence we approximate the formulation using the following
expectations
µλ = E
[
λ
]
, µr = E
[
||r||1
]
. (9)
To solve this problem, we transform the minimum perfor-
mance requirement into a chance constraint, and rewrite (7)
as a chance-constrained stochastic programming problem
max
g,C
J(g, C) = µλC − E
[
δ
µλ
µr
||Cr − bg||1 +A(b
g)
]
s.t. Prob
[
P (Cr, b) ≥ ρmin
]
≥ ξ
g ∈ G, C ∈ [0, B] . (10)
where ξ is the confidence level that the performance require-
ment will be satisfied, and G is the set of all feasible operation
policies g that satisfy (2)–(4) and the causality condition.
III. OPTIMAL CONTROL AND BIDDING POLICY
We propose an online control policy and a bidding policy
that solve problem (10). Control and bidding in the regulation
market are part of a sequential decision-making process be-
cause the regulation capacity C is cleared before the actual
dispatch. We therefore work backwards by first determining
the optimal online control policy g∗ with respect to any cleared
regulation capacity (Fig. 1)
g∗ ∈ argmax
g∈G
J(g, C) (11)
We then derive the optimal bidding policy C∗ based on the
optimal control policy:
C∗ ∈ arg max
C∈[0,B]
{
max
g∈G
J(g, C)
}
s.t. Prob
[
P (Cr, b) ≥ ρmin
]
≥ ξ . (12)
We consider the performance chance constraint at the bidding
stage because it depends primarily on the regulation capacity
and the battery energy capacity (see Section III-B). We assume
that r is energy zero-mean (including efficiency losses) be-
cause either the system operator or the participant can employ
strategies for controlling the average BES SoC, and these
strategies do not effect a participant’s objective of minimizing
its operating cost.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the proposed control policy. The policy keeps track of
the real-time maximum and minimum SoC level. When the distance between
them reaches the calculated threshold uˆ, the policy starts to constrain the
response. (a) dispatch instruction vs. response; (b) Controlled vs. uncontrolled
SoC profile.
A. Optimal Control Policy
Algorithm 1: Optimal Battery Regulation Response Policy
Result: Determine battery dispatch points bt
// calculate optimal cycle depth
set uˆ→ ϕ−1
(
η2+1
ηR
π
)
;
// set current max/min energy level to e0
set e0 → e
max
0 , e0 → e
min
0 ;
while t ≤ T do
// read et and update min/max energy level
set max{emaxn−1, et} → e
max
t , min{e
min
t−1, et} → e
min
t ;
// activate energy level bounds if either
reached uˆ or the state of charge
constraints
set min{E, emint + uˆE} → E
g
t ;
set max{E, emaxt − uˆE} → E
g
t ;
// read Crt and enforce soc bounds
if Crt ≥ 0 then
set min
{
1
Mη
(E
g
− et), Crt
}
→ bt ;
else
set max
{
η
M
(Eg − et), Crt
}
→ bt ;
end
// wait until the next control interval
set t+ 1→ t;
end
The online regulation response policy balances the cost of
deviating from the regulation signal and the cycle aging cost
of batteries while satisfying operating constraints. This policy
takes a threshold form and achieves an optimality gap that
is independent of the total number of time steps. Therefore
in term of regret (consequence of decision-making under
uncertainty) [46], this policy achieves the strongest possible
5result: the regret does not grow with time. The key part of
the control policy is to calculate thresholds that bound the
SoC of the battery as functions of the deviation penalty and
degradation cost. The bound on the SoC uˆ is given by:
uˆ = ϕ−1
(η2 + 1
ηR
π
)
, π = δ
µλ
µrM
(13)
where ϕ−1(·) is the inverse function of the derivative of
the cycle stress function ϕ(x) = dΦ(x)/dx. Algorithm 1
summarizes this control policy, and Fig. 2 shows an example
of control based on this policy, where the battery follows the
dispatch instructions until the distance between its maximum
and minimum SoC reaches uˆ.
Fig. 3 explains the intuition of the proposed policy. First
we consider an arbitrary cycle in the regulation provision.
The battery performs a cycle by following the regulation
instruction and avoids a penalty cost linear to the cycle depth,
but undertakes a nonlinear aging cost. Hence there exists
an optimal full cycle depth uˆ that maximizes the operating
profit over a single cycle. The battery should stop following
the regulation instruction once this optimal depth is reached,
which is equivalent to setting a SoC bound as described in
the proposed policy. In cases that the aging cost function is
convex, this optimal bound can be explicitly calculated from
(13), and the proposed policy has a bounded regret given in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Suppose the battery cycle aging stress function
Φ(·) is strictly convex. The proposed control strategy g(·) has
a worst-case optimality gap (regret) ǫ that is independent of
the operation time duration TN :[
δ
µλ
µr
||Cr − b∗||1 −A(b
∗)
]
−
[
δ
µλ
µr
||Cr − bg||1 −A(b
g)
]
≤ ǫ
∀ e0 ∈ [E,E], C ∈ [0, B], and
∀ sequences {rt} ∈ [−1, 1], t ∈ {1, . . . , T } (14)
where b∗ ∈ argminb∈B(e0) π||Cr − b||1 −A(b).
A proof of Theorem 1 can be found in [47], and mathe-
matical derivations of the control policy and the optimal SoC
bound uˆ are summarized in Appendix A. The regret exists
since battery operation may contain a residue that cannot be
matched into cycles. Note that the optimality of the proposed
policy depends on the convexity of the cycle aging function,
however the computation and implementation of the proposed
policy does not require convexity and this policy applies to
any batteries that have a monotonic increasing cycle stress
function.
B. Optimal Regulation Capacity
We first show that under the optimal control policy and
when relaxing the minimum performance constraint, a partici-
pant should adopt a price-taker bidding strategy, i.e., it should
provide the maximum possible regulation capacity under any
market prices. We then incorporate the performance chance
constraint and show that the performance-constrained optimal
capacity can be explicitly characterized based on statistics of
historical regulation signals.
$
Cycle depth (SoC deviation)
0
Penalty avoided
Aging cost
Optimal SoC bound
Fig. 3. Illustration of the optimal cycle depth when responding to regulation
instructions. During a single cycle, the participant avoids a mismatch penalty
that is linear with respect to the cycle depth, and undertakes a nonlinear cycle
aging cost (this relationship is explained Appendix. A). Hence there exists
an optimal cycle depth that maximizes the operating profit which is the area
between the two curves.
Theorem 2: When relaxing the minimum performance
requirement, the optimal regulation capacity C∗ is equal to
the BES power rating B when using the proposed optimal
response policy g∗.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The intuition for this theorem is that the proposed pol-
icy guarantees optimal operating profit under any regulation
capacity and signal realization. A higher regulation capacity
offers higher profit potential since market payment is capped
by λC. Therefore under optimal real-time control, a participant
will never earn less profit with a higher capacity because the
penalty cost never exceeds the market payment.
Stemming from Theorem 2, the solution of (12) is reduced
to finding the maximum C while satisfying the performance
chance-constraint. The challenge is that the regulation signal
realization is unknown when determining the regulation ca-
pacity. We must therefore characterize a probabilistic function
that correlates the performance index ρ with the regulation
capacity C. In addition, since the battery regulation response
b
g under the proposed policy g∗ is price responsive, we must
also take the expected clearing price µλ into consideration.
We start with the performance index calculation with the
regulation signal realization r and show that it can be reformed
into a function with respect to bg/C, which is the normalized
battery response
P (Cr, b) = 1−
||Cr − bg||1
C||r||1
= 1−
||r − bg/C||1
||r||1
. (15)
Recall that in the proposed policy the battery energy level
is constrained between E
g
and Eg that are calculated from
battery data and the penalty price. We substitute bg/C into the
proposed policy and show that bg/C only depends on Eg/C
and Eg/C since the battery operation constraints (2)–(4) are
linear
bgt
C
=
{
min
{
(E
g
− et)/(MηC), rt
}
if rt ≥ 0
max
{
(Eg − et)/(MηC), rt
}
if rt < 0 .
(16)
We omit the effect of the battery initial energy level e0 on the
performance index because r has a zero mean (i.e. it is energy
neutral). The performance index thus depends only on the ratio
between the usable energy capacity of the battery E
g
− Eg
6and the regulation capacity C. We can therefore define this
ratio as the normalized regulation energy capacity γ
γ =
E
g
− Eg
C
=
min{E − E, uˆE}
C
(17)
where we substitute uˆ into E
g
−Eg as in Algorithm 1. Recall
that uˆ is calculated from the expected market clearing price,
hence we represent γ as a function of µλ and C.
Having shown that the performance index only depends
on γ, we now define a probabilistic function P γξ (γ) of γ,
which means that a battery with a normalized regulation
energy capacity of γ is ξ certain to reach a performance score
of P γξ (γ). Hence we can rewrite the performance chance-
constraint as
Prob
[
P (Cr, bg) ≥ P γξ (γ)
]
= ξ (18)
and P γξ (γ) can be determined by simulating historical regula-
tion signals assuming that the regulation signal distribution is
stationary.
Lemma 1: P γξ (γ) is monotonic over P
γ
ξ (γ) ∈ (1−δ, 1) and
has an inverse function [P γξ ]
−1(ρ) over ρ ∈ (1− δ, 1).
Proof: This lemma is trivial. First we consider a regulation
signal realization set r, the minimum performance index that
a battery can possibly score is 1 − δ because the rest is
not dependent on the battery response. Before reaching the
perfect performance of 1, an increment in γ must result in an
improvement in the performance index due to that γ is the only
constraining factor. This is true for any realizations of r, hence
it is trivial that P γξ (γ) is monotonic over P
γ
ξ (γ) ∈ (1− δ, 1).
Following Lemma 1, if a participant wishes to reach a
performance score ρ ∈ (1− δ, 1) with exactly ξ confidence, it
must use the following value of γ:
γ = [P γξ ]
−1(ρ), ρ ∈ (1− δ, 1) (19)
We now combine Theorem 2, (17) and (13) to characterize
analytically the optimal regulation capacity when using the
proposed optimal response policy:
C∗(µλ) = min
{
B,
min{E − E, uˆE}
[P γξ ]
−1(ρmin)
}
where uˆ = ϕ−1
(
η2 + 1
ηRµrM
δµλ
)
(20)
The only variable in this equation is µλ. The rests are either
based on the market policy or the BES design. It is easy to
see that if Φ is strictly convex, C∗(µλ) is monotonic over the
following range
C ∈ (0, C)
where C = min
{
B,
E − E
[P γξ ]
−1(ρmin)
}
(21)
and C is the maximum regulation capacity a participant could
provide in order to reach the performance index ρmin with a
confidence of at least ξ.
Algorithm 2: Optimal Battery Regulation Bidding Policy
Result: Determine the regulation offer price λb
associated with capacity segment Cb
// starts from the first (cheapest) bid segment
set 1→ J ;
// goes through each segment until reaching C
while
∑J
j=1 C
b
j ≤ C do
// total capacity offered so far
set
∑J
j=1 C
b
j ≤ C → C
total;
// total payment price expected
set [C∗]−1(Ctotal) → λtotal;
// calculate the segment offer price
set (λtotalCtotal −
∑J−1
j=1 λ
b
jC
b
j )/C
b
J → λ
b
J ;
// go to the next capacity segment
set J + 1→ J ;
end
C. Optimal Bidding Policy in Regulation Markets
At the bidding stage in the regulation market, each partici-
pant must submit a segment bidding curve that specifies how
much regulation capacity that it is willing to provide at a given
market price. We denote this set (λb,Cb) = {(λbj , C
b
j ) ∈
R
2
+ | j ∈ N}. Therefore, each participant needs a bidding
policy to calculate λb with respect to the regulation capacity
segments Cb.
The optimal bidding policy is straightforwardly based on
(20) and (21): a participant uses the inverse function of C∗(·)
to calculate the offer price associated with each capacity
segment, while the total offered capacity must be smaller
than C in order to satisfy the performance requirement. This
optimal bidding policy is described in Algorithm 2.
IV. SIMULATION
A. Data and Setting
We use the following parameters for the battery energy
storage in simulations unless otherwise specified:
• Charging and discharging power rating: 10 MW
• Energy capacity: 3 MWh
• Charging and discharging efficiency: 95%
• Maximum state of charge: 95%
• Minimum state of charge: 10%
• Round-trip efficiency: 92%
• Battery cycle life: 1000 cycles at 80% cycle depth
• Battery shelf life: 10 years
• Cell temperature: maintained at 25◦C
• Battery pack replacement cost: $ 300 /kWh
• Li(NiMnCo)O2-based 18650 lithium-ion battery cells
These cells have a near-quadratic cycle depth stress func-
tion [43]:
Φ(u) = (1.57E-3)u2.03 . (22)
We use a simple control policy as a benchmark in all of
the following simulations. The simple policy uses all battery
energy capacity [E,E] for operation and does not consider the
7penalty price or the cycle aging cost, hence it is equivalent
to fixing uˆ = 1 in the proposed policy. Although this a naive
control approach, it has been used in most stochastic real-time
battery operation studies [14], [48], [49].
B. Illustration of Theorem 1
TABLE I
SIMULATION WITH RANDOMLY GENERATED DISPATCH SIGNALS.
Case pi η T uˆ Maximum regret [$]
[$/MWh] [%] [%] Proposed Simple
1 50 100 100 11.1 0.00 183.9
2 100 100 100 21.9 0.00 127.5
3 200 100 100 42.8 0.00 47.9
4 50 92 100 11.2 0.06 184.9
5 50 92 200 11.2 0.06 408.8
We illustrate Theorem 1 by comparing the results of the
proposed control policy with those of the simple control policy,
Table I summarizes the simulation results. In each case the
battery was subjected to 100 simulated regulation signals. Each
case has a different simulation duration T , or penalty price π,
or efficiency η. Control regrets are calculated by comparing
the results from the control policy with the offline optimal
control where all regulation signals are known. The proposed
control policy achieves negligible regrets in all cases, while the
simple policy control result has a significantly higher regrets.
A further discussion of these results can be found in [50].
C. Illustration of Theorem 2
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Fig. 4. Full year revenue analysis of a 1 MWh BES participating in
the regulation market with different regulation capacities. The total colored
area reflects the payment a participant receives for regulation capacity. The
operating profit is calculated by subtracting the aging and penalty costs from
the total payment. (a) With the proposed control policy; (b) With the simple
control policy.
We illustrate Theorem 2 by simulating a 1 MWh BES
providing a full-year regulation service with varying regulation
capacities in the PJM market using price and signal data from
03/2016 to 02/2017. The minimum performance requirement is
not enforced in this example. Fig. 4 shows the simulation result
for the proposed policy and the simple policy to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our method.
The result in Fig. 4 includes the aging cost, the performance
penalty cost, and the operational profit for regulation capacities
up to 10 MW. With the proposed policy, the profits increase
with the regulation capacity, which validates Theorem 2. With
the simple policy, the BES operation is somewhat profitable
when the regulation capacity is below 4 MW, but this prof-
itability disappears completely once the regulation capacity is
greater than 8 MW.
D. Case Study
We simulate a BES providing dynamic regulation (RegD)
service in the PJM regulation market using signal and price
data for a full-year (from 03/2016 to 02/2017) assuming the
BES is a price taker and its bids has no effect on the market
clearing price. The minimum performance index requirement
for this market is 0.7, and the settlement period in one
hour. δ in the performance index model (1) is set to 2/3
which approximates the PJM performance index calculation,
this approximation is described in Appendix C. All ex-post
performance index calculations are performed according to the
PJM manual [23].
The regulation signal is slightly biased to make it en-
ergy zero-mean, a realistic assumption in the current market
structure [8]. Parameters of the bidding policy, including the
value of µr and the function P
γ
ξ , are determined using the
PJM RegD signal from 06/2013 to 05/2014. The value of
µλ is calculated from the PJM capacity and performance
clearing prices using a mileage ratio of 3 based on the PJM
market clearing manual [7]. We consider 10 1 MW regulation
capacity offer segments for a 10MW/3MWh BES. The BES
thus offers a total of 10 MW regulation capacity. The offer
price associated with each segment is calculated according to
the proposed bidding policy using the performance index simu-
lation result from 2013, as shown in Fig. 5a. Fig. 5b shows the
histogram of the regulation capacity cleared from the proposed
bidding policy under different performance confidence. The
performance confidence function concluded from the 2016
data is slightly different from 2013, in particular, the energy
capacity requirement at high confidence levels are higher,
possibly due to changes in the dispatch algorithm, unexpected
weather conditions, or increased renewable penetration.
For comparison, we include a benchmark strategy, where
the 10MW/3MWh BES participates the regulation market as
a price taker and always offers 10 MW regulation capacity.
Hence over the course of a year this BES provides a total of
87600 MW·h of regulation capacity. The benchmark case uses
a simple control strategy that always dispatches the entire BES
energy capacity in response to regulation instructions.
Table II summarizes the case study results, showing that the
proposed policy earns more profit than the benchmark strategy
for all performance confidence levels. On the other hand,
the benchmark strategy has a higher regulation performance
because it always dispatches the entire battery energy capac-
ity. The operating profit increases with a lower performance
8TABLE II
CASE STUDY RESULTS IN PJM REGD MARKET 03/2016-02/2017.
Benchmark Optimal participation under ξ performance confidence
ξ = 99% ξ = 95% ξ = 90% ξ = 85% ξ = 75% ξ = 50%
Market income [k$] 1472.9 494.8 823.2 958.8 1035.9 1164.9 1266.8
Aging cost [k$] 1091.8 67.5 165.8 213.0 240.3 286 326.3
Prorated operating profit [k$] 381.1 427.3 657.4 745.7 795.6 878.6 940.5
Battery cell life expectancy [month] 9 69 42 35 33 29 26
Annual average performance 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.84
Hours of under-performance 6 81 204 246 297 426 1022
Total regulation capacity cleared [MW·h] 87600 14991 29051 36838 42166 54087 73504
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Fig. 5. PJM case study. (a) The relative regulation capacity γ vs. different ξ
from simulating historical regulation signals in 2013 and 2016; (b) Histogram
of all cleared regulation capacities in 2016 from the proposed bidding policy
under difference confidence ξ.
confidence, i.e., a riskier strategy earns more profit. The
downside of a riskier strategy is that the BES’s offer may
become noncompetitive because the system operator considers
historical performance when clearing the market. We plot
the operating profit (Fig. 6a) and the average performance
(Fig. 6b) to show the trade-off between profit and risk. It is
clear that while the average performance index decreases ap-
proximately linearly with ξ, the marginal increase in operating
profit becomes smaller, i.e., the profit from a riskier regulation
market participation saturates. Therefore, a participant must
carefully balance profit and risk in actual market scenarios.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an optimal control policy and an
optimal bidding policy for battery energy storage participating
in performance-based regulation market. The proposed poli-
cies consider the cycle aging mechanism of electrochemical
battery cells, and are adaptive to realistic market settings.
We validate the optimality of the proposed policies using
simulations, and demonstrate their effectiveness by a case
study based on the PJM frequency regulation market.
Performance-based frequency regulation markets have been
proposed for around five years and their designs are still
maturing. With an increasing number of battery participants,
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Fig. 6. PJM case study risk analysis. (a) Annual prorated operating profit
vs. performance confidence ξ; (b) Average annual performance index vs.
performance confidence ξ.
frequency regulation markets are becoming increasingly com-
petitive. As exemplified by the ongoing market revisions in
PJM, system operators may also tighten the performance
requirements. We hope this study can inspire future researches
on topics such as regulation market design considering profit-
seeking battery participants, how will the regulation market
saturates, and how will that impact the profitability of different
types of participants.
APPENDIX
A. Supplement Material to Theorem 1
We calculate the optimal depth by transforming the opti-
mization objective into a function of cycles instead of battery
dispatch power bt. We first observe that bt should never exceed
the regulation instruction Crt such that
0 ≤ [bt]
+ ≤ C[rt]
+ (23)
0 ≤ [−bt]
+ ≤ C[−rt]
+ (24)
because otherwise the participant would undertake the per-
formance penalty and the cost of degradation simultaneously.
The mismatch term ||Cr − b||1 in the objective function can
be written as
||Cr − b||1 = Cµr − ||b||1 (25)
9because µr = ||r||1. The next step is to represent ||b||1 with a
combination of cycles. We assume that the battery dispatch
profile b consists a set of full cycles of depth u with no
residue, i.e., all battery operation can be identified into cycles
by the rainflow method. The summation all full cycles u must
equal to the sum of all positive variations in the battery SoC
as
||u||1 =
1
E
T∑
t=2
[et − et−1]
+ =
Mη
E
T∑
t=1
[bt]
+ (26)
and similarly for negative SoC variations it follows that
||u||1 =
1
E
T∑
t=2
[−et + et−1]
+ =
M
Eη
T∑
t=1
[−bt]
+ (27)
and ||b||1 can be rewritten as
||b||1 =
T∑
t=1
[bt]
+ +
T∑
t=1
[−bt]
+ =
η2 + 1
ηM
E||u||1 . (28)
We now substitute (25) and (28) into and rewrite the objective
as a function of cycle depths (recall that all cycle depths are
positive)
J(g, C) = µλC − E
[
δ
µλ
µr
||Cr − bg||1 +A(b
g)
]
(29)
= (1− δ)µλC +
|u|∑
i=1
[η2 + 1
η
πEui − ERΦ(ui)
]
where π = δµλ/(µrM). (29) achieves the unconstrained
minimum under the following condition
∂J
∂ui
= 0, ui = uˆ = ϕ
−1
(η2 + 1
ηR
π
)
(30)
where uˆ is the optimal cycle depth, and the battery regulation
operation is always profitable if all cycles are limited below
uˆ. The proposed control policy therefore caps all cycle depths
below uˆ while enforcing operation constraints (2)–(4), (23)
and (24). This optimal solution assumes all battery operation
can be mapped into full cycles, however in most cases the
rainflow method left a residue profile in which no more full
cycles can be identified [40]. This leads to a control regret ǫ
that is characterized by Theorem 1. ǫ is calculated as
ǫ = 2Jw(uˆ) + Jv(uˆ)− 2Jw(wˆ)− Jv(vˆ) (31)
where
vˆ = ϕ−1
( π
ηR
)
(32)
wˆ = ϕ−1
(πη
R
)
(33)
Jv(v) =
1
η
πEv −
1
2
ERΦ(v) (34)
Jw(w) = ηπEw −
1
2
ERΦ(w) . (35)
Please refer to [47] for further discussions and proof of this
result.
B. Proof for Theorem 2
We start this proof by calculating the derivative of the
response cycle depth with respect to the regulation capacity.
In the proposed control policy, the battery follows regulation
instruction until reaching uˆ, so the depth of a cycle scales
linearly with C, then according to (28)
∂u
∂C
=
{
ηM/[E(η2 + 1)] if u < uˆ
0 else
(36)
Then we calculate derivative of the expected profit with respect
to C based on (29)
∂J(g, C)
∂C
= (1− δ)µλ +
|u|∑
i=1
[η2 + 1
η
πE − ERϕ(ui)
]∂ui
∂C
= (1− δ)µλ +
ηM
η2 + 1
∑
ui<uˆ
[η2 + 1
η
π −Rϕ(ui)
]
(37)
Which is strictly greater than zero because δ < 1 and for
ui < uˆ
Rϕ(ui) < Rϕ(uˆ) = (η
2 + 1)π/η , (38)
when Φ(·) is strictly convex and ϕ = dΦ/du is an strictly
increasing function. Therefore, the optimal regulation capacity
C∗ that maximizes the expected operating profit is equal to
maximum possible capacity bidding, which is the BES power
rating B. Theorem 2 is hence proved.
C. PJM Performance Index Simplification
PJM penalizes the entire regulation payment with the per-
formance index, which is calculated with equal weights on
precision, correlation, and delay [23]:
PerformanceIndex = (39)
1
3
(
PrecisionScore + CorrelationScore+ DelayScore
)
while all scores are valued between 0 to 1. The precision score
is the absolute error of the regulation response as
Precision = 1−
||Cr − b||1
||Cr||1
(40)
The delay score is evaluated over the delay under which
the time-shifted BES response achieves the highest corre-
lation with the regulation instruction, and this correlation
coefficient is the correlation score. Because BES responses
to dispatch commands instantaneously, the response profile
always achieves highest correlation with the instruction at zero
delay, hence the BES always has full delay score. However
considering the difficulty of incorporating correlation index
calculation into a convex programming problem, we approx-
imate the correlation score to be the same as the precision
score. The PJM performance index calculation is therefore
simplified to
PerformanceIndex =
1
3
(
2− 2
||Cr − b||1
||Cr||1
+ 1
)
= 1−
2
3
||Cr − b||1
||Cr||1
(41)
which is the same as setting δ = 2/3 in (1).
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